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Cost Implications of Hospital Unionization:
A Behavioral Analysis
ABSTRACT
The growth of unionization among hospital workers was sharply
accelerated by the 1974 amendments to the NLRA covering voluntary
hospital workers. tlith continuing inflationary pressures in the hos-
pital sector, the cost implications of the recent and projected growth
of hospital unions is of some concern to policy-makers. This paper
presentsestimates of union cost impacts based ondata from hospitals
in the states of Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania.
Cross—sectional regressionswith data for 1975yield positive unionim-
pacts of3.3 percent on total costs, 4.1 to 5.9 percent on cost per
case, and 6.1 percent on cost per day. Re-estimation of the model with
data on changes over the 1971-75 period yields similar results.
Wealso find that the cost impact of unionization varies with the pattern
ofcoverage (being lower for service employees and RN's) and with the
extent of cost-based reimbursement. This suggests that future cost
impacts of union growth may be moderated as prospective payment systems
for hospitals become more widespread.
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I. Introduction
Since the coverage of voluntary hospital employees under the National
Labor Relations Act in August of 1974, the extent of unionization among
hospital employees has increased steadily. According to data from the
American Hospital Association annual surveys, over the 1973-1980 period
the percentage of voluntary hospitals with union contracts rose from
15.7 to 23.2.1 Further union growth is expected over the next decade;
several recent studies of unionization trends project that between 45
and 65 percent of hospitals will have union contracts by 1990.1 ,2
In the face of strong inflationary pressures in the hospital sector,
and continuing debate about appropriate policy responses, it is important
that we understand the inflationary implications of the expected growth in
unionization. Although empirical studies of hospital costs have been
numerous, analysis of union impacts on costs has been rather limited.
Most recent econometric research has been confined to one aspect of union
cost impacts, namely, impacts on wages.
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Evidence from other industries,
however, suggests that union effects on non-wage variables such as turnover,
worker quality, and productivity may also be important,6'7 Several recent
studies8'9 have estimated quasi-technological cost functions to
union effects on the cost of producing a given level and mix of hosp
output, but possible impacts on unit and total costs resulting from the
response of output levels and mix to unionization are not captured in thi
methodology. In contrast, reduced-form behavioral cost regressions can
capture these effects on output levels and thus provide a more comprehensive-2-
estimateof union cost impacts. Two recent studies of union cost impacts have
used this approach and reported positive union effects on cost per day
(ranging from 3.5 to 10.2 percent) and cost per case (rangingfrom 4.1
to 9.0 percent).'0'
Thepresentstudy provides additional evidence of union impacts based
on this behavioral approach. It differs from the twostudies just cited
in several respects. First, it presents estimates of union impacts on
both total and unit costs. Second, it utilizes detailed information on
the duration, extent, and pattern of employee unionization to construct a
series of independent variables describing each hosoital 's collective bar-
gaining status. Third, to control for selectivity effects ofomitted
variables that are correlated with collective bargaining status, it presents
estimates of union cost impacts on both the level of costs in 1975 and the
change in costs over the 1971-75period.12 Fourth, to construct the depen-
dentvariables, the present study uses data from audited Medicare cost reports
rather than the unaudited cost data from the !merican Hospital association (AHA)
Annual Surveys.13
II. Data and Model Specification
The analyses reported here are based ondatafor fiscal years 1971and 1975
fromshort-term non-Federal hospitals in four Northeasternstates: Maryland,
Massachusetts,New York and Pennsylvania. These hospitals were identified
from the listings in the 1976AHAGuide to the Health Care Field. For fiscal
year 1975,completedata were obtained on617 of the roughly 700 hospitalsin
these four states listed in the Guide. Complete data for bothfiscal 1971
and fiscal 1975 wereobtained on440 hospitals.—3-
The dependent and independent variables used in the analyses are
defined in Table 1. (Details on the construction of these variables
and data sources are given in the Appendix.) Values for the dependent
variables were obtained from Medicare Cost Reports. For the 1975 cross—
sectional analysis, the cost concept used to define the dependent variables
(i.e., total reimbursable costs after Medicare adjustments) is computed
as total operating expenses (including depreciation) minus direct ex-
penses for non-reimbursable cost centers (e.g., gift shops, research)
andfor personal patient care services rendered by physicians. Since
a comparable cost concept was not used in the 1971 cost reports, the
dependent variables for the analysis of 1971-75 changes are based on
totaloperating expenditures.
Our specification ofindependent variables follows that of previous
behavioral costmodels)4 The hospital is viewedas making decisions
aboutproduct prices, quality, and input quantities so as to maximize an
objectivefunction subject to prevailing input and output market conditions
and technological constraints. Hence, the level of costs which results from
these decisions is a function of the exogenous determinants of product
demand and factor prices in the hospital's market area. Hospital charac-
teristics relating to ownership (PROP, GOV, CATH) and teaching activities
(NURS, MED, DRESIDNI) are included to capture differences in hospital
objectives; however, effects of these variables on costs may also reflect
product-mixdifferences (including the mix of educational services versus
patient care services produced by the hospital) and factor-supply effects
(e.g. , the availability to Catholic hospitals of labor inputs from members
of religious orders). Capital stock variables (LBDA, ECFRAT, INDEX, INDEXD)-4-
capture the effects of variations in fixed capital inputs as well
as product-mixdifferences)5 The geographical durrunies (MASS, MD,
NYC,NYNNYC) are listed in Table 1 as factor—price variables but
they also serve to control for differences in the timing of fiscal
years.16
Several different aspects of each hospital's collective bar-
gaining situation arecapturedby our unionization variables. In
addition to a dumy variable for the presence of a collective bar-
gaining agreement (UNION), we have used data on the employee groups
covered by agreements to construct a proxy for the fraction of the
hospital work force covered (COy). The hypothesis that union cost im'-
pacts vary with the types of employees covered is tested by including
dummy variables for the coverage status of the two largest employee
groups, service employees (DSV) and registered nurses (DRN), which
respectively comprise roughly 38 and 30 percent of the hospital work
force. Since large national unions may have greater expertise in bar-
gaining, greater resources to endure conflicts, and a stronger interest
in economic issues than professional organizations (such as state nurses'
associations), we have tested for differences in cost impacts among types
of unions by including a national union dummy (DNATLUN). Cost implications
of "Balkanization" of the work force into different bargaining unitsrepre-
sented bydifferent unions are explored by including the number of urons
in the hospital (TOTALUN). Variations in cost impacts with the duration
of the collective bargaining relationship are allowed for by including the
duration variables UN74 and UN71.-5-
All regressions were estimated with ordinary least squares.
As is indicated in Table 1, the dependent variables and most independent
variables were entered as logarithms. Those independent variables
which took on zero values for any data points, such as the unionization
variables, were entered in linear form.
III. Characteristics of the Study Sample
Average characteristics of the unionized and non—unionized hospitals
in the study sample are compared in Table 2.In the 1975 cross-sectional
analysis, 236 unionized hospitals and 381 non-unionized hospitals com-
prise the study sample. In the analysis of 1971-75 changes, hosoitals
with any collective bargaining agreements in effect for at least half
of fiscal 1971 were exciudech thus, the 106 unionized hospitals in this
analysis became unionized during the 1971-75 period. (Some hospitals
were also excluded from this analysis because of missing data for fiscal
1971.)
Comparison of fiscal 1975 data reveals that unionized hosnitals were
on average much larger than non-union hosnita1s exponentiatinci the lona-
rithmic means for LBDA and dividing by 365 days yields bed complementfigures
of 236 and 150 for union and non-union hospitals respectively.17 The differ-
ence in logarithmic means for LREA implies a total cost level in union hos-
pitals that is 103 percent higher; corresponding differentials for cost ner
caseand cost per day are 74 percentand 24percent respectively.Mean
valuesfor LMCAID and LDEN indicate that union hosnitals tend to be located
in more densely populated areas with a hirher Dercentage of public aid
recipients. The unionsample also contains proportionately more government
hospitals(13.6percent vs. 3.9percent), more hospitals with medtcal -&ehool-6-
school affiliations (33.9 oercent vs. 16.5 percent) and residency
proarams (44.9 percent vs. 24.7 percent), more hospitals in Massachusetts
and in New York City, and Droportionately fewer hosnitals in Maryland
andPennsylvania. Pniongthe unionized hospitals, 68.1 percent have con-
tracts with national unionsi,8the average estimated fraction of the 'cork-
force unionized is 55.4 percent, and the average number of unions repre-
senting workers in each hospital is 1.84.
Looking at the 1971-75changes,we see that the average total cost
increaseis higher for the hospitals unionized during this period (70.6
percent) than for the non-union hospitals (65.5 percent). The differential
inthe percent increase of cost per case is only slightly smaller (59.5
vs.54.8) whilethecorresponding differential in cost per day is larger
(73.8 vs.65.2).Comparison of average changes invariables that miciht
indicateexternal inflationary pressures (LCOL,LAVEW,PCINC) suiaeststhat
suchpressures can not explain much of the difference in rates of cost
increase between newly-unionized and non-union hospitals; however, a more
careful assessment of this question requires that we examine the full set
of regression results presented below. Also note that the mean value for
UN74 in the newly-unionized sample indicates26.4 percent of these hosoitals
hadno union contracts until fiscal 1974 or 1975 while 73.6 nercent had
such contracts prior to fiscal 1974. Thus, the estimated union effects in
the analysis of 1971-75 changes reflects at least several years' exoerience
with collective bargaining for most of the newly-unionized hospitals.—7—
IV.RegressionResults
We consider first our summary estimates of average union impacts
obtained by including the UNION dummy and all other independent variables
not pertaining to unionization.19For each dependent variable, regressions
were estimated with all these independent variables included; then a second
round of estimates was obtained excluding variables with t-statistics less
than 1.0. This two-step process was then repeated excluding HW1 since this
variable was based on reported payroll expenses for the individual hospitals
and therefore might be regarded as endogenous. (The construction of HW1
is described in the Appendix.)
Results are reported in Tables 3 and 4 for the second round of regression
estimates.2°In the 1975 cross-section (Table 3), the UNION coefficients
indicate positive cost impacts of roughly 3.3 percent on total costs (LREA),
4.1 to 5.9 percent on cost per case (LREADIs)., and roughly 6.1percent on
cost per day (LREADAY). Coefficients in both of the total cost and one of
the cost per case regressions fall just short of the 0.10 significance level
(two-tailed) while the other three UNION coefficients are highly significant.
In comparison with these results, the estimated UNION coefficients based
on 1971-75 changes (Table 4) are remarkably similar. The coefficient magni-
tudes in the cost per case and cost per day regressionsare slightly smaller,
indicating positive cost impacts of 3.4 to 3.9 percent and 5.3 to 5.8 nercent
respectively.Moreover, t-statistics exceed the critical values for t
0.10 significance level inallcases.21
Resultsfor the other independent variables are less consistent. In
the 1975 cross—section, coefficients for INDEX (or INDEXD), HW1, MD, MED
and ECFRAT are always positive and significant while the proprietary. hospital
dummy (PROP) is always significantly negative. Other variables that are-8-
significant in at least one regression for each of the three dependent
variables are MASS, LCOL, and SIJRGRAT, though the negative sign of the
latter's coefficients is somewhat surprising. xnong the remaining variables,
CBINS1 and GOV are consistently positive and usually significant in the
unit cost (LREADIS and LREADAY) regressions but do not significantly affect
total costs (LREA). Conversely, LHPOP, LMCAID, INSUR1, and LBDA are sig—
nifcant in at least one LREA regression but none of the unit cost regressions.
LAVEW, PCINC, DRESIDNT, and LGPPOP were not significant in any of the 1975
cross-section regressions. (The first three of these variables were not
included in the regressions shown in Table 3 since they had t-statistics less
than 1.0 in all first-round regressions.)
In the analyses of 1971-75 changes, the explanatory power of the regres-
sions was somewhat lower and the number of significant variables was smaller,
particularly in the cost per case (LEXBDIS) regressions. Moreover, results
for many of the variables were not qualitatively similar to the corresponding
1975 cross-section estimates.22 In view of this variability in results, the
stability of the estimated union impacts seems even more striking.
Regression results with a more detailed specification of each unionized
hospital's collective bargaining situation are presented in Tables 5-7. As
before, all regressions were first estimated with all other independent vari-
ables included and then re-estimated deleting these variables with t-statistics
less than 1.0.23 In addition to examining the cost impacts of variations in
the extent, pattern, and duration of union coverage, we also tested three
interaction hypotheses relating to unionization. First, CBINS1 x COV was
includcd to test the proposition that union impacts on costs would be more
positive when they could be passed through to third parties under cost based
reimbursement schemes.24 Second, it has been suggested that multi-employer-9-
bargaining exerts a countervailing power that reduces union cost impacts;9
since New York City is the only locality in our study states with "ulti-
employer bargaining, we test this hypothesis by including the interaction
variable NYC x COV. Third, the inclusion of (NYC +NYNNYC)x COV allows
for a differential effect of the extent of collective bargaining coverage
in New York State which niiqht result from the influence of rate regulation.25
Looking first at the 1975 cross-sectional results for total costs (LREA)
inthefirst three columns ofTable5,weobserve that COy,DSV, andDRN
arenearly significant with HW1 excluded and become significant when HW1
is included or when other clearly insignificant unionization variables
(TOTALUN, UN71, UN74) are excluded.26 The negative coefficients for DSV
and DRN imply that the inflationary impact of union contracts for service
workers and registered nurses is smaller than for other employee groups;
infact, the magnitudes of coefficients suggest this impact is actually
negative.27
Analogous regressions with data on 1971-75changes (columns 7-9
ofTable 5) show a similar pattern of results but with several important
differences. In particular, the coefficients for COV are smaller and less
significant while the coefficients for TOTALUN are now strongly positive
when HW1 is included or DNATLUN is excluded. The large and significant
negative coefficients for UN74 imply that union impacts on total costs are
not positive during the first two years of unionization.28
Tests of the three interaction variables with cross-sectional data
(columns 4-6) yield positive and significant coefficients for CBINS1 x COV,
as predicted by the cost-pass-through hypothesis; however, this result is
weaker in the 1971-75 change regressions (columns 10-12). The two other
interaction coefficients are never significant. Also note that inclusion-10-
of the interaction variables does not dramatically change the results
formost other unionization variables. The one exception to this is
COVwhichis highly correlated with the interaction variables (parti-
cularlyCBINSlxCOy)by construction. Because of this high correlation,
onewould expect the coefficients of CBINS1 x COV and COytohave opposite
signs.29Note, however, that the negative coefficients obtained for COV
when CBINS1 x COy is included do not imply a negative partial effect of
COV on total cost. For example, the results in column 6 imply that the
partial effect of COV will only be negative if CBSINS1is lessthan 3.44;
in fact, no observed values of CBINS1 were this low.
The cost per case regressions (Table 6) yield a similar pattern of
results to the total cost regressions. Once again COV, DSV, and DRN are
generally significant, particularly in the cross-section regressions,
but the magnitudes of their coefficients are slightly larger. TOTALUN
is again strongly positive in the 1971-75 change regressions except when
the hospital-specific wage variable (HW1) is included. While the coeffi-
cients forthe recent unionization variable (UN74) are again consistently
negative, their magnitudes and significance are now greater in the cross-
sectionregressions and smaller in the 1971-75 change regressions. Regres-
sions with the interaction variables again tend to confirm the cost-pass-
through hypothesis but they •also yield a significantly negative NYCxCOV
interaction coefficientin the cross-section analysis. This suoports the
multi-employer bargaininghypothesis stated earlier.
Our final set of regression results pertains to cost per day (Table 7).
Althoughthe same general pattern of results emerges, a few differences
fromthe total cost and cost per case regressions should be noted. First,—11 —
thenational union (DNATLUN) coefficient is more positive and signi-
ficant in all 1975 cross-section regressions. Second, the negative DRN
coefficients are weaker in the cross-section regressions but stronger in
the 1971-75 change regressions. Third, the interaction results in the
1971-75 change regressions are rather different: NYC x COV coefficients
are more strongly positive, the New York State interaction ((NYC +NYMNYC)
x COV) is more strongly negative, and the cost-pass-through variable
(CBINS1 x CDV) has no perceptible effect.3°
V. Discussion
The various regression models described here all confirm the basic
result that unionization increases the cost of hospital services. Thus,
it appears that gains in hospital productivity (due to improved worker
quality, lower turnover, or management responses to unionization), to the
extent that they occur at all, are not sufficient to offset union-induced
employee compensation increases. While we did not derive separate cost
impact estimates for wage and non-wage (i.e., productivity) effects of
unionization,conjectures about the magnitudes of these separate effects
can be based on estimates of the wage-elasticityof costs and union im-
pacts on compensation. Our own coefficient estimates for HW1 indicate a
wage-elasticity of costs of approximately +0.5 in cross-section data
(Table 3), but are much smaller and less significant in the regressions
on 1971-75 changes (Table 4). Estimates from other studies with pooled
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data indicate elasticities similarto our cross-section result. Using
the +0.5 figure as an approximate consensus estimate, we find that the
union cost impacts in the +3,4 to -1-6.1 percent range (as reported above)
would only be consistent with negative non-wage effects (i.e., union-induced-12-
productivity gains) if union compensation effects were above the
range +6.8 to ÷12.2 percent. Our own estimated union compensation
effects of +5 percent reported elsewhere32 as well as those from
other studies 25generally tend to be near or below the lower end
of this range, suggesting that union-induced nonwage effects are
in fact zero or positive. The contrast between this finding and
recent reports of union-induced productivity gains in other indus-
tries 33may be a reflection of a more general difference between ser-
vice and manufacturing industries in responding to unionization, but
it could also be explained by special characteristics of the hospital
industry such as the prevalence of cost-based reimbursement. The often-
significant interactions between unionization and cost reimbursement
reported here lend support to the latter of these two explanations.
Several other aspects of our results are of interest. First, the
similarity between our cross-section and 1971-75 change regressions indi-
cates that selection bias due to omitted hospital-specific characteristics
which are associated with unionization (and stable over time) is not a
problem in cross-sectional studies. Second, the fact that union impacts
are greatest for per diem costs and smallest for total costs is consistent
witha negative union effect on the volune of output. This could be in-
terpreted in the context of the standard behavioral cost model as a move-
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ment up the hospital 's downward-slopingproduct demand curve. Moreover,
since union impacts on cost per case and total cost are fairly close,
it appears that most of the reduction in output volume takes the form of
shorter lengths of stay rather than fewer cases treated.35 The negative
output-volumeeffect implies that projections of growth in total hospital
expedenditures arising from future increases in unionization may be biased—13-
upward if they are based on results of unit cost regressions, parti-
cularly cost per day regressions.
Third, and perhaps most important, our results strongly suggest
that union cost impacts vary considerably among hospitals depending
upon the types of employees covered, the fraction of the work force
covered, the types of unions representing employees and perhaps even
the duration of coverage. For example, we have already noted, based
on the coefficient estimates from our cross-section total cost regres-
sions (specifically, column 3 of Table 5) that unionization of service
workers covered under a union contract with a national union has a
minimal impact on costs. By contrast, if all other employees in the
hospital are covered as well, a total cost increase of approximately
8 percent would occur according to our estimates.36
Previous estimates of future hospital cost increases due to union
growth imply that this growth will not be a significant source of infla-
tionary pressure. In particular, Becker et al) have projected that the
percent of hospitals with union contracts will increase from 27 percent
in 1980 to 45-50 percent in 1990 but that this will increase real hospital
spending by only 5 percent in comparison with HCFA projections of overall
real spending growth of 58 percent between 1979 and 1990. While this
projection was based on cost impact estimates similar to those reported
here, our own findings point up several additional factors which miqht
anplifyor diminish the projected cost increase. First, since cost
impacts increase with the fraction of the work force covered by unions,
and since our own data (Table 2) and figures reported elsewhereshow
that only about half of all employees in unionized hospitals are now
covered by union contracts37 it is clear that future growth in union-14-
coverage within already-unionized hospitals may be an important
additional source of inflationary pressures. Second, our estimates
suggest that cost impacts for employee groups which are more heavily
unionized (e.g., service workers and RN's) are small. If future
union growth primarily involves other employee groups, the average
38 . . costimpact of unionization will rise. Third, in view of the evidence
for cost-pass-through union effects presented here, one might at least
hope that the shift in hospital payment away from cost reimbursement
to prospective mechanisms may serve to moderate the inflationary
pressure of future union growth.A-i
Appendix: Data Sources
Dependent variable values were calculated from data on expenditures,
discharges, and inpatient days in the Medicare Cost Reports filed by each
study hospital;LBDA and ECFRAT were taken from the same source. It should
also be noted that ECF bed days available are not included in LBDA or
the denominator of ECFRAT. PROP, GOV, CATH, MED. DRESIDNT, and NURS are
taken from the 1975 AHA Annual Survey data. INDEX was also constructed
from these AHA data in a two-step procedure. First, AHA data for hospitals
in all other states (except Alaska and Hawaii) were used to estimate regres-
sions of average cost per case in which dumies for the presence of various
facilities and services, for medical and nursing school affiliations, for
ownership type, for service specialty code of the hospital, and for geo-
graphic location (SMSA size and region) were among the included independent
variables. Other independent variables related to bed complement, numbers
of interns, residents, and other trainees per case, and the mix of inpatient
and outpatient services. Second, the coefficients for the services and
facilities dummies, affiliation dummies, service specialty dummies, and
interns, residents, and trainees variables were multiplied by the AHA data
values for these variables for the study hospitals and the resulting products
sunnTied to create INDEX values. INDEXD was created in the same way using a
cost-per-day regression based on AHA data.
Unionization data were obtained from a variety of sources including
AHA survey information for 1970, 1973 and 1975, state labor relations comi-
ssionsfiles and publications, state hospital associations, unions, NLRB
published election reports and unpublished data from NLRB files, and in a
few instances telephone contacts with individual hospitals. Per capita in-
come, population, household size, county hospital bed supply and countyA-2
physician supply data were taken from the Pnerican Medical Association
annual publication Physician Distribution and Medical Licensure in the
United States. LAVEWwasbased on service industry payroll data published
bythe U.S. Commerce Dept. in County Business Patterns for SIC categories
70 (hotels and lodging places) and 72 (personal services). County land
area data used to compute LDEN were from the Statistical Abstract of the
United States.
LCOL was derived from family budget figures developed by the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). For hospitals located in the Baltimore,
Washington, Boston, Buffalo, New York, Lancaster, Philadelphia and Pitts-
burgh SMSA's, published SMSA data were used to compute LCOL. For hospitals
located in other SMSA's or counties outside SMSA's, a predicted value of
LCOL was developed from a regression equation estimated with published BLS
data for 39 large SMSA's. Independent variables in this regression were
per capita income, population density, SMSA size dummies and census region
dumies.
CBINS1 was computed by summing the percentage of the population with
regular Blue Cross coverage, the percentage of the population with Medicare
coverage, and the percentage of the population with Medicaid coverage. The
Blue Cross percentage for the area customarily served by each Blue Cross
plan was based on data published in the Blue Cross-Blue Shield Fact Pok.
This figure was used for each county within the customary service area.
The Medicare percentage was based on enrollment figures in U.S. Social
Security Administration, Medicare, Health Insurance for the Aged and
abled, Section 1.1: Reimbursement by State and County.Disabled MedicareA-3
enrollees are only included in the 1975 data since they were not covered
in 1971. (The number of over-65 enrollees was also used to compute
LAGED.) As a proxy for the number of persons (under 65) covered by
Medicaid, we used the numbers of cash recipients under AFDC, SSI(except
aged recipients), and general assistance in the county as published in U.S.
National Center for Social Statistics, Recipients of Public Assistance
Money Payments and Amounts of Such Payments by Program, State, and County
and U.S. Social Security Administration, Supplemental Security Income:
State and County Data.
To compute INSUR1, we combined the data on Medicare and Medicaid cited
above with data from the Health Interview Survey (HIS) of the U.S. National
Centerfor Health Statistics on the percent of the under-65 population with
BlueCross or commercial hospital insurance coverage in Primary Sampling
Units (PSU's) within the four study states. Counties within PSU's were
assigned the value for the PSU. For counties outside of PSU's, predicted
values generated from an insurance coverage regression were employed. Since
HIS data were only available for calendar 1972 and 1974, estimates were ad-
justed to reflect the change in coverage in the entire state from 1971 to
1972 and from 1974 to 1975 as reported by the Health Insurance Institute in
theirSource Book of Health Insurance Data.
HW1was derived from AHAAnnualSurvey data, for each hospital, on
average payroll and employee benefit expenses per full-time-equivalent em-
ployee. (Physicians, dentists, interns, residents and other trainees, and
expensesfor these groups were exluded from our calculations.) Regression
analysis was used to adjust this 'average for differences in personnel mix
between hospitals and for union impacts onwages. The 1975regression was
estimatedfrom data on the 617 study hospitals plus an additional 35 hospitals
whichhad been excluded from the cost regressions because of missing data butA-4
which met all other criteria for inclusion in the study; for 1971 data
on 434 of these hospitals were employed. To calculate HW1, coefficients
from this regression were used to adjust observed values of the dependent
value for variations in all independent variables except LAVEW, LCOL,
and PCINC.
For further details on the hospitals included in the study and our
data sources and adjustments, see David Salkever, "The Impact of Collective
Bargaining on Hospital Costs," Chapter 4 and Appendices A-F, H, and I.F—i
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to the total variability of product-mix in the hospitals under study,
the degree of simultaneity bias introduced by this short-run variation
should be relatively unimportant. A more fundamental consideration
is that unionization may have long-run effects on product mix and
fixed capital inputs. If so, the estimated union cost impacts in these
short-run behavioral models may diverge somewhat from the lona-run cost
impacts. This qualification should be borne in mind in interpreting
the results presented here and in other similar studies.
16. For Maryland and Pennsylvania hospitals, the fiscal year covered the
period July 1 to June 30. Massachusetts hospitals generally used an
October 1 to September 30 fiscal year while New York hospitals used a
calendar year. The geographical dummies alsoControl for the influence of rate-
setting. Hospital regulation programs were in effect in three study
states during fiscal 1975. The program in Maryland took effect in July
of l974 covering all but Medicare and Medicaid patients, but formal rate
determinations were not actually made until late 1975. In Massachusetts,
rate—setting was introduced for Medicaid patients in April of 1974 and
for self-paying and commercially-insured (i.e., non-Blue Cross) patients
in August of 1975. Because these programs were limited in scope and cre
just getting under way during fiscal 1975, their Presence exerted little
influence on the results reported here. The program in New York, -whichF-4
covered Blue Cross and Medicaid patients, was initiated in 1970.
Although well-established by fiscal 1975, its impact on costs was
greatly weakened by a variety of administrative and political problems.
Consequently, econometric studies of the NewYorkoronran's early years
show little effect on the level or growth rate of costs. See (.oe1en
andSullivan, 2P cit., and David Salkever, Hosnital Sector Inflation
(Lexington, Mass.: Lexinqton Books, 1979). In Pennsylvania, a few
hospitals in thewestern part of the state participated in a voluntary
prospective nayment systen forBlue Cross and Medicare patients during
the1972-75 neriod. Differences in reaulatory imPacts on costs amonci the
states were also probably diluted by the Federal Economic Stabilization
nrogram which covered all hospitals from Puciust 1971 to nril 1974. Thus,
it seems unlikely that these differences were a major confoundinci factor
inour analysis.
17.It should be noted, however, that there is considerable overlap in the size
distributionsof union and non-union hospitals. While the difference in
mean values for LBDA between thetwo grouns of hospitals is only 0.455,
thestandard deviations for thisvariable exceed 0.7.
18.National unions inthe study sample include District 1199 of the National
Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees, the Service Employees'
International Union, the ?nierican Federation of State County and Municipal
Employees,the Laborers' International Union, the International Union
of Operating Engineers, the International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers,
and the Teamsters.
19. Note that INDEXD is only included in the regressions on LREADAY and LEXBDAY
whileINDEX is excluded from these regressions.F-5
20. Results from the initial regressions are presented in Chapter 4 and
Appendix J of David Salkever, "The Impact of Collective Bargaining on
Hospital Costs." Final Report on Grant HS 03016 submitted to the Na-
tional Center for Health Services Research, U.S. Dept. of Health and
Human Services. The Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health,
1981.
21. The initial regression results for UNIONwerevery similar to those
reported here. The only notable difference was in the LREADIS
regression with HW1 excluded. The UNION coefficient was larger
(0.046) and significant at the 0.10 level.
22. The dummy variables in the 1971-75 regressions, except for those per-
taining to unionization, were not defined as changes. Thus their
interpretation in these regressions is different from the 1975 cross-
section. For example, the significantly negative coefficients for
NYC and NYNNYC in the LEXBDAY regressions imply that the rate of in-
crease (i.e., the logarithmic change) in cost per day was significantly
lower in New York than in Pennsylvania (the omitted geographic category).
23. As in the regressions already presented, INDEX was replaced by INDEXD
in the cost per day regressions, and all regressions were estimated
with and without HW1. Also note that UN71 was not included in the
1971 -75 change regressions, and that because of missing data these
regressions were estimated with data from only 411 hospitals when HW1
was included.
24. Ronald Tiller, "Collective Bargaining in Nonprofit Hositals." Ph.D.
thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1969.F-6
25. A special circumstance which might tend to diminish any detectable
regulation effect is that prior to 1975, union-negotiated wage in-
creases were passed through in the New York rate-setting systen. See
Diane Hamilton and Gilbey Kamens, r'ational Hospital Rate-Setting Study
Vol. VII: Case Study of Prospective Reimbursement in New York U.S.
Health Care Financing Administration, April 1980.
26. When DNATLUN is also excluded, the coefficients forCOy, DSN,
and DRN become slightly larger and more significant.
27. We noted earlier that service employees and RN's comprise about
38 and 30 percent of the hospital work force respectively. (These
figures are based on national data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics. For details on their derivation, see Salkever, "The
Impact of Collective Bargaining on Hospital Costs," Appendix E.)
Usingthese figures and the COy, DSV, and DRN coefficients in
Column 3ofTable 5,wecan calculate the predicted effects of
serviceemployee and RN unionization on LREA as (0.38 x 0.321 -0.165)
=-0.04and (0.30 x 0.321 -0.124)=- 0.03respectively. Of
course, if we add the estimated effect of national unions (DNATLUN)
since these unions commonly represent service employees, the cost
impact figure for this group wouldbecome weakly positive.
28.For example, using the coefficients estimates from column 9 cF
Table 5, the meanvaluesfor TOTALUN, COy, DSV, and DRN from
column 3 of Table 2, and setting UN74 =1yields an estimated overall
union effect of -0.004.F-7
29. The reason for this can be seen by considering the regression
model =a + h X1 + b2X2. The least-squares estimates
of the b's in this model can be expressed in terms of zero-
order correlation coefficients (r's) and standard deviations
(Sj's) as follows: b1(r31 - r32r12) S3/(l -r122)S1 and
b2 =(r32
-
r31r12) S3/(l -r122)S2. When r12 is close to
1.0 because of collinearity, the signs of b1 and b2 willgenerally
be the same as the signs of (r31 - r32) and (r32 - r31)respectively.
Iam indebted to Michael Grossman for this observation.
30. Regressions with a variety of combinations of the unionization
variables, in addition to those shown here, were also computed.
Results generally showed a similar pattern of union effects to that
reportedhere. However, because of collinearity among the unioni-
zation variables, there were a few minor variations in findings
which should be noted. First, in the regressions on LREADIS, the
DNATLUN coefficient often becomes positive and sionificant when
COV, TOTALUN, and CBINS1 x COy are excluded; the Mew York Stateinter-
actionalso became significant when (CBINS1 x COy) and COV were
excluded. Second, in regressions on the change in LEXBDIS, the
New York State interaction coefficient becomes significantly nega-
tive when DNATLUN, TOTALUN, and UN74 are deleted. Third, in the
regressions on LREADAY, the coefficient of NYC x COV becomes smaller
and much less significant when COy is excluded. Fourth, in the
regressions on the change in LEXBDAY, the coefficients for DSV and
DRN become insignificant when both COY and CBINS1 x COY are deleted,
while the CBINS1 x COV coefficient becomes positive and significant whenF-8
COy is deleted. These results are reported in Salkever,
'The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Hospital Costs,"
Chapter 4 and Appendix J.
31. These other studies, which estimated wage elasticities of cost
per case and per day, are: Frank Sloan, Roger Feldman,and Bruce
Steinwald, "Effects of Teaching on Hospital Costs," Journal of
Health Economics (forthcoming) and Sloan and Adamache, pcit.
Adamache and Sloan (.cit.)combine these estimates with the
presumption (based on previous research) that the wage-elasticity
of patient days is -0.1 to arrive at a wage elasticity for total
costs of 0.47.
32. David Salkever, "Cost Implications of Hospital Unionization: New
Estimates and a Review of Recent Research," in R. Scheffler and
L. Rossiter (eds.), Advances in Health Economics and Health Services
Research, Vol. 4 (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, forthcoming).
33.Charles Brown and James Medoff, "Trade Unions in the Production
Process," Journal of Political Economy, June 1978; KimClark,
"Unioni zati on and Productivity: Micro-Econometric Evidence,"
QuarterJournal of Economics, December 1980.
34. The price elasticity of demand for days of care implied by
the difference between the cost impact estimates can be cal-
culated using the UNION coefficients in Tables 3 or 4. For
example, since LREA =LPD+LREADAY(where LPD is the logarithm
o.fpatientdays), it is true thatLREA/UNION = [C DLPD/ LREADAY)
+1Jx LREADAY/a UNION. If cost per day is approximately equal
to the average gross price, LREADAY plus the logarithm of theF-9
average coinsurance rate approximates the logarithm of net price
and LPD/ LREADAY is approximately equal to the price elasticity
of demand. To calculate this price elasticity, we divide the UNION
coefficient in the LREA regression by the UNION coefficient in the
LREADAY regression and subtract 1.0 from the result. Thus, the
estimatesin Table 3 yield a price elasticity of patient days of
roughly -0.4
35.This is consistent with a larger price-elasticity for days of care
by patients in the hospital than for admissions. Note, however, that
in the cross-section regressions with HW1 included, the union impact
on cost per case is almost equal to the cost per day impact.
36.Letting COy, DSV, DRN and ONATLUN all equal 1.0, their combined effect
on LREA is +0.08, which implies a percentage cost increase of 8.3.
37.According to Current Population Survey data for the late 1970's, about
15 percent of all hospital workers were union members. (Brian Becker,
Glen Cain, Catherine McLaughlin, Richard Miller and Albert Schwenk,
"The Union Impact on Hospitals: A National Study.t' Final Report on
Grant HS 02661 submitted to the U.S. National Center for Health Ser-
vices Research. Industrial Relations Research Institute, University
of Wisconsin -Madison,January 1981, Chapter 2. Since 27.4
percent of all hospitals had union contracts in1980 (Becker,
Sloan and Steinwald, p. cit.), and since these hospitals were
larger on average than non-union hospitals, it isdoubtful that
more than half of the employees in these unionized hospitalswere
covered by union contracts.
38. On the other hand, the fact that the already-unionized hospitals
are larger suggests that the total cost impactof unionization
spreading to new hospitals will be smaller.TABLE 1:DEFINITIONS OF DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Variable
:!yp Name Definition
Dependent, IREA Logarithm of reimbursable expense after adjustnents
1975Cross-
Section
LREADIS Logarithm of reimbursable expense after adjustments
per discharge
LREADAY Logarithm of reimbursable expense after adjustments
per inpatient day
Dependent, LEXB Logarithm of operating expense
LEXBDIS Logarithm of operating expense per discharge
LEXBDAY Logarithm of operating expense per inpatient day
Product PCINC Logarithm of county per capita income (deflated)
Demand INSUR1 loqarithm of percent of county population covered by
hospital insurance
CBINS1 Logarithm of percent of county population covered by
cost-based hospital insurance
LMCAID Logarithm of percent of county population receiving
public assistance and SSI, except old—age asssistance
(Medicaid proxy)
LAGED Logarithm of the percent of the county population
age 65 or over
LHSIZE Logarithm of average number of persons per household
in the county
LDEN Logarithm of county population density
LHBPOP Logarithm of county population multiplied by ratio of beds
In the hospital to short-term beds in the county
LPFIYSPOP Logarithm of physicians In office—based practice
per thousand population In the countY
LGPROP Loaarithm of general practitioners per thousand population
In the county
SURGRAT Ratio of surgeons to total physicians in office-based practice
Capital LBDA Logarithm of bed-days available in the hospital
Stock Inthefiscal year
ECFRAT Ratio of ECF to hospital bed days available
INDEX Costlinessindex of facilities and services
(based on cost per admission)
INDEXD Costliness index of facilities and services
(based on cost per day)Table 1(ContInued)
Variable
Type Name Definition
Factor ICOL Logarithm of living costs
Price
L.AVEW Logarithm of average service Industry payrolls
in the county
HW1 Hospital-specific wage adjusted for unionization
MD Maryland dummy
MASS Massachusettsdummy
NYC New York City dummy
NYNNYC New York non-New York City dumy
Hospital PROP Proprietary hospital dummy
Characteristics
GOV State or local government hospital dummy
CATH Catholic hospital dummy
MED Medical—schoolaffiliation dummy
DRESIDNT AMA-approved residency dummy
HORS Nursing-school dummy
Unionization UNION Collective bargaining agreement dummy
COV Estimated percent of employees covered by
collective bargaining
TOTALUN Number of unions covering employees in the hospital
DNATLIJN National union dummy
UN74 Dummy for hospital where collective bargaining
started after fiscal 1973
UN71 Dummy for hospital where collective bargaining
started prior to fiscal 1973
DSV Dummy for hospital where any service workers are covered
by a collective bargaining agreement
URN Dummy forhospital whereanyregistered nurses are covered
by a collective bargaining agreementTABLE 2: MEAN VALUES FOR DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES





























































































































































































MASS, MD,NYCand NYNNYC are
other variables, mean values
**Because of missing data, 1971-75 changes for HW1 are calculated for 99unionized
hospitals and 312 non-unionized hospitals.
9.135
Mean values for NURS, PROP, GOV, CATH, LIED, DRESIDNT,
based on the 1975 values of these variables. For all
are for changes from 1971 to 1975.
0.33 7TABLE 3: 1975 CROSS—SECTION REGRESSION RESULTS WITH UNIONIZATION DUt44Y
Ct—statisticsin parentheses)








LBDA 0.924 O.948 —0.030
(23.12) (24.20) (0.84)
LHSIZE ..o.47oc -0644 -0.123
(2.87) (4.48) (0.83)
LDEN 31C 0053c





SURGRAT 0339a -0.190O.5ll _0382b 0343b -0.197





CBINS1 0.119 0.125 Q•197b o.io
(1.33) (1.19) (1.96) (2.63) (1.98)
ICOL 0573b o•638 Q558a i.o52 '1502
(2.23) (2.67) (1.88) (5.64) (2.57)
ECFRAT O.285 0•285c 015h O.186 O.652
(4.53) (4.69) (2.51) (2.76) (12.08) (12.79)
NURS -0.028 -C.039 037a
(1.10) (1.63) (1.71) (2.04)
b
PROP _fl•215C •11fl$C _013C -0.111 O.l6l '1.l6O
(4.R1) 4.&3) (2.59) (2.15) (4.18) (4.39)
C C
GOV O.fl33 O.l37 0.144 0.101 O.ll3
CATH _0•056b





0.139 0.139 0 lOSe O.lOlc O.146C O.l5O
(4.78) (4.97) (3.28) (3.18) (5.75) (6.26)
MASS 0331b 0.063 0155b O.172C 0062a (LOglC
(2.52) (1.62) (2.52) (5.46) (1.88) (3.03)
O.2O8c O.l54c O.l9lC O.126C O.182c O.ll5C
(5.14) (3.93) (4.13) (2.79) (5.17) (3.37)
NYC 15b 0129a
(2.40) (1.85)
NYNNYC 0.198C O.l24C O.2O4 O.1SOC 0.026
(6.19) (5.07) (5.36) (5.94) (1.21)
INDEX 0.724c 0717c 0g57C O.952C






UNIaI 0.032 0.033 0.040 0.057's 00611C
(1.56) (1.64) (1.63) (2.44) (3.32) (3.37)
CONSTANT -1.157 -5.318 -0.033 1.542 -5.114 -3.0fl
R2 0.956 0.960 D.53 0.668 0.638 0.670
*
Inthis and subse11uent tables two-tailed stat1t1ca1 slonificance levelsforcoefficients areinicated
by the f,llowinn notations: a -0.10 level, b 0.0level, c -0.')llevel.TABLE 4:REGRESSION RESULTS FOR1971-75CHANGES WITH UNIONIZATION DUP?IY
Dep.Vble. LUll LEX8 LEXBOIS LEXBDIS LEXBDY EXSDAY
LHPOP _O.lg6 -0.109 -fl.l65 ..tLO99C
(2.95) (1.62) (5.31) (2.84)
LNCAID —0.032 -0.02'
(1.11) (09')
LAGED 0449b 0423b 372b
(2.20) (2.01) (2.20) (2.P1)
LBDA O.534c O.536c fL115 0134b





(2.84) (2.97) (2.29) (1.15)






INSUR1 -0.369 C J)
C -0.252C -0.248 b
(3.65) (3.1R) (2.70) (2.57)
BINS1 _0326b (130Qa
(2.09) (1.7)
PCINC 0.096 (1.103 0.146 0.115 0178a
(1.05) (1.07) (1.34) (1.(8) (1.87) (1.s)
L0I. 0513b O.649 0.226 O.38
(2.35) (2.89) (1.02) (1.17)
LAVEW ..0.135 _(1.16*a -O.1"2
(1.60) (1.89) (1.03) (1.12)
EFRAT O.Z63 O.37l O.l83 0•20)C fl359C
(8.28) (8.zo) (3.57) (3.93) (8.22) (8.6')
NURS 0037b 032a -0.020 -0.026
(2.19) (1.26) (1.19) (1.7)
PRa' O.147c _O.144c _O.lOlc 0107C —0.057 -fl.O5
(4.14) (4.07) (2.63) (2.67) (1.61) (1.9)








MASS 0032a 0035a —0.069 -0.053
(1.701, (1.841,
(2.45) (2.03)
MD 0.062 0.259 -0.048 -0.0
(2.50) (2.26) (1.58) (1.26)
NYC O.O63 0067a ..0144C -r1.139C
(1.74) (1.77) (3.81) (3.69)
NYNNYC _fl.099C -fl,089C
(4.42) (4.14)
INDEX 0.233c o.2siC 41155b
(4.43) (4.57) (2.56) (1.o4)
!NDEXD 0.017
(0.73)
HWI -0.00.1 0.082 0.1.49
b (0.161, b 1•16a c
UNION 0.033 (1.032 0.038 fl.fl3 0.052
(2.15) (2.04) (2.12) (1.P4) (3.39) (3.E1)
CCNSTPNT 0.505 (1.5U' 0.194 0.550 (1.477
0.535 0.507 0.184 0.17' 0.339 0.347T
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